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Abstract
BACKGROUND—The first identified cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus infection in 
humans occurred in China during February and March 2013. We analyzed data obtained from field 
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investigations to describe the epidemiologic characteristics of H7N9 cases in China identified as of 
December 1, 2013.
METHODS—Field investigations were conducted for each confirmed case of H7N9 virus 
infection. A patient was considered to have a confirmed case if the presence of the H7N9 virus 
was verified by means of real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction assay (RT-
PCR), viral isolation, or serologic testing. Information on demographic characteristics, exposure 
history, and illness timelines was obtained from patients with confirmed cases. Close contacts 
were monitored for 7 days for symptoms of illness. Throat swabs were obtained from contacts in 
whom symptoms developed and were tested for the presence of the H7N9 virus by means of real-
time RT-PCR.
RESULTS—Among 139 persons with confirmed H7N9 virus infection, the median age was 61 
years (range, 2 to 91), 71% were male, and 73% were urban residents. Confirmed cases occurred 
in 12 areas of China. Nine persons were poultry workers, and of131 persons with available data, 
82% had a history of exposure to live animals, including chickens (82%). A total of 137 persons 
(99%) were hospitalized, 125 (90%) had pneumonia or respiratory failure, and 65 of 103 with 
available data (63%) were admitted to an intensive care unit. A total of 47 persons (34%) died in 
the hospital after a median duration of illness of 21 days, 88 were discharged from the hospital, 
and 2 remain hospitalized in critical condition; 2 patients were not admitted to a hospital. In four 
family clusters, human-to-human transmission of H7N9 virus could not be ruled out. Excluding 
secondary cases in clusters, 2675 close contacts of case patients completed the monitoring period; 
respiratory symptoms developed in 28 of them (1%); all tested negative for H7N9 virus.
CONCLUSIONS—Most persons with confirmed H7N9 virus infection had severe lower 
respiratory tract illness, were epidemiologically unrelated, and had a history of recent exposure to 
poultry. However, limited, nonsustained human-to-human H7N9 virus transmission could not be 
ruled out in four families.
The first identified cases of human infection with a novel influenza A(H7N9) virus occurred 
in eastern China during February and March 2013 and were characterized by rapidly 
progressive pneumonia, respiratory failure, the acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), 
and fatal outcomes.1 We analyzed available data from field investigations to characterize the 
descriptive epidemiology of laboratory-confirmed cases of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus 
infection in humans that were reported to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (China CDC) as of December 1, 2013. In this report, we summarize the 
epidemiologic findings of case investigations and follow-up monitoring of close contacts of 
persons with confirmed cases of H7N9 virus infection who have been identified to date. 
Investigations are ongoing.
METHODS
CASE DEFINITIONS
The case definitions of suspected and confirmed human infection with H7N9 virus were 
based on the H5N1 case definitions, as recommended by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) in 2006 (Section S1 in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of 
this article at NEJM.org).2 A patient was considered to have a confirmed case if the presence 
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of the H7N9 virus was verified by means of real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-
chain-reaction assay (RT-PCR), viral isolation, or serologic testing. The laboratory test 
assays for H7N9 virus that we performed have been described previously (Section S2 in the 
Supplementary Appendix).1
IDENTIFICATION OF CASES
Suspected cases of H7N9 virus infection among hospitalized patients with pneumonia were 
identified through the Chinese surveillance system for pneumonia of unknown origin, which 
was established in 2004.3,4 Beginning on April 3, 2013, enhanced surveillance was 
implemented for suspected cases of H7N9 virus infection among persons with mild or 
moderate illness.5 Persons with suspected cases of H7N9 virus infection with mild or 
moderate illness were identified from the Chinese sentinel surveillance system for influenza-
like illness, which has been described previously.6 Once each suspected case of H7N9 virus 
infection was identified, the local CDCs, including prefecture and provincial CDCs, 
conducted the initial field investigations and obtained respiratory specimens, which were 
shipped to the National Influenza Center of the China CDC in Beijing for H7N9 laboratory 
testing. The China CDC was involved in field investigations of the first 82 confirmed cases 
of H7N9 virus infection; local CDCs conducted field investigations of subsequent confirmed 
cases.
DATA COLLECTION
The National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) determined that the 
collection of data from H7N9 case patients and their close contacts was part of a continuing 
public health investigation of an outbreak and was exempt from institutional review board 
assessment. Data were collected through a review of medical records and interviews with 
relatives, contacts, and health care workers who provided medical care for the case patients. 
We collected information on the dates of illness onset, visits to clinical facilities, 
hospitalization, and clinical outcomes. Epidemiologic data were collected through 
interviews and field observations and were reported to the China CDC. Investigators 
interviewed the relatives of each patient with a confirmed case of H7N9 virus infection to 
determine exposure histories during the 2 weeks before the onset of the illness, including the 
dates, times, frequency, and patterns of exposures to poultry or other animals such as swine 
and wild birds. All epidemiologic information that was collected during the field 
investigations, including exposure history, timelines of events, and identification of close 
contacts, was cross-validated, since we were unable to interview any critically ill H7N9 case 
patients. Households and places known to have been visited by the case patients in the 2 
weeks before the onset of illness were investigated to assess exposures to poultry and swine, 
as well as environmental exposures. We also collected information on control measures 
implemented by national, provincial, and municipal governments.
IDENTIFICATION AND FOLLOW-UP OF CLOSE CONTACTS
We defined close contacts of patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection as described 
previously for H5N1 field investigations7 (Section S3 in the Supplementary Appendix); once 
we identified the close contacts, we monitored them daily for 7 days for symptoms of illness 
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and collected throat swabs from contacts in whom symptoms developed to test for the 
presence of H7N9 virus.
Antiviral chemoprophylaxis was not provided to close contacts. Paired serum samples were 
obtained for H7N9 serologic testing from patients with suspected H7N9 virus infection who 
did not have respiratory specimens available. Oseltamivir treatment was recommended for 
close contacts in whom symptoms developed (Section 3 in the Supplementary Appendix). 
Data on demographic characteristics and exposure were collected for close contacts.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
We used descriptive statistics to summarize the epidemiologic characteristics and H7N9 
testing results for persons with suspected cases of H7N9 virus infection, for those with 
confirmed cases, and for close contacts of those with confirmed cases. The methods we used 
for estimating the incubation period have been described previously.8
RESULTS
EPIDEMIOLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFIRMED CASES
From March 25 through December 1, 2013, respiratory specimens from 1372 hospitalized 
patients with pneumonia of unexplained origin were tested, and 104 patients (7.6%) were 
confirmed to be infected with the H7N9 virus. Of 2,130,049 respiratory specimens obtained 
from outpatients with an influenza-Iike illness through the sentinel surveillance system for 
influenza-like illness, 8 (0.0004%) tested positive for the H7N9 virus. As of December 1, 
2013, a total of 139 laboratory-confirmed cases of H7N9 virus infection (Fig. 1 and 2) and 1 
suspected case had been identified; cases were identified in the following 10 provinces and 2 
municipalitits: Zhejiang (50 confirmed cases), Shanghai (33 confirmed cases), Anhui (4 
confirmed cases), Henan (4 confirmed cases), Hunan(2 confirmed cases, Beijing (2 
confirmed cases)), Shandong (2 confirmed cases), Guangdong (2confirmed cases), and 
Hebei (1 confirmed case).
The median age of patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection was 61 years (range, 2 to 
91; interquartile range, 46 to 73); 58 cases (42%) occurred in persons 65 years of age of 
older, and 4 (3%) were in children younger than 5 years of age, all of whom had clinically 
mild upper respiratory illness (see Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Appendix for the age 
distribution). Most confirmed cases (71%) occurred in males, 73% of the case patients were 
urban residents, and 79 of 108 patients with available data (73%) had underlying medical 
conditions (TabIe 1). Among 70 of 79 case patients with sufficient data for a more specific 
classification of underlying conditions, 54 (77%) were considered to be at increased risk for 
influenza complications owing to age (<5 years or ≥65 years) or prevalence of certain 
underlying medical conditions.9 Nine of the patients with confirmed cases (6%) worked as 
poultry workers: 6 slaughtered poultry at a live poultry market, 2 transported live poultry, 
and 1 raised and traded pigeons.
A total of 137 of 139 patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection (99%) were hospitalized 
(Table 2), and 125 (90%) had pneumonia or respiratory failure. Among the 103 patients with 
confirmed cases for whom data were available, isolation precautions were instituted for 65 
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(63%) in an intensive care unit (ICU) because of severe lower respiratory tract disease. 
Among patients with cases identified as of December 1, a total of 47 with confirmed H7N9 
virus infection (34%) and 1 with suspected infection had died of the acute respiratory 
distress syndrome (ARDS) or multiorgan failure in the hospital, 2 critically ill patients with 
confirmed cases remained hospitalized, and 88 had been discharged. One 2-year-old boy and 
one 25-year-oId woman with mild upper respiratory tract illness were not hospitalized. 
Among 139 confirmed cases of H7N9 virus infection, 49 (35%) were confirmed by means 
of virus isolation, 1 by means of serologic testing, and the remaining 89 (64%) by means of 
nucleic acid detection. Five of 139 persons with virologically confirmed cases also tested 
seropositive for H7N9 virus antibodies with the use of a turkey red-cell hemagglutinin 
inhibition assay (Table 1).
Data on recent exposure to animals were available for 131 of the 139 patients with 
confirmed H7N9 virus infection. Of these, 107 (82%) reported a history of recent exposure 
to animals (Table 1): 88 (82%) to chickens, 24 (22%) to ducks, and 6 (6%) to swine; the 
exposures occurred either while they were working at or while they were visiting a live 
animal market. Other animals that these 107 patients reported having been exposed to 
included pigeons, geese, quail, wild birds, pet birds, cats, and dogs. Information on a history 
of exposure to live animals is unclear for 8 patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection, 
either because the investigations are still ongoing or be-cause data on exposure could not be 
obtained from patients owing to critical illness resulting in death. The estimated median 
incubation period in 23 patients with confirmed cases for whom detailed data on animal and 
environmental exposures were available was 6 days (range, 1 to 10)(Table S1 in the 
Supplementary Appendix).
FAMILY CLUSTERS
As of December 1, four family clusters had been identified in three areas. Detailed 
information on exposure, date of illness onset, and follow-up for these family clusters is 
provided in Figure 3, and in Section S4 in the Supplementary Appendix. The first family 
cluster comprised two persons with confirmed H7N9 virus infection and one with a 
suspected infection. The index case patient and his father (confirmed case 2) lived in the 
same house, and the index patient’s brother (confirmed case 1) lived with his wife nearby. 
After the index case patient (suspected case 1) became ill, his brother (confirmed case 1) and 
his father (confirmed case 2) had prolonged, close, unprotected contact with him, including 
eating together, providing care, and accompanying him to seek medical care before his 
hospitalization (Fig. 3A, and Section S4 in the Supplementary Appendix). None of the three 
members of the cluster raised poultry or other animals, none brought live poultry into their 
home, and none had direct contact with sick or dead poultry. The index case patient had 
visited a live poultry market, purchased a chicken, observed the slaughtering process, 
brought the freshly killed chicken home, and prepared, cooked, and ate the chicken within 2 
weeks before the onset of his illness.
The second family cluster included two persons with confirmed H7N9 virus infection (Fig. 
3B, and Section S4 in the Supplementary Appendix). After the father (confirmed case 1) 
became ill, his daughter (confirmed case 2) had prolonged, close, unprotected contact with 
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him, including eating together, providing care, and accompanying him to seek medical care 
before his hospital admission. She also provided unprotected bedside hospital care for her 
father during the period from March 11 through March 15. Diarrhea developed in the father, 
and the daughter washed her father’s diarrhea-soiled underwear on March 18 while wearing 
gloves. The father had visited a live poultry market 7 days before the onset of his illness. 
The daughter did not raise poultry or animals at home and had not had any exposures to 
animals (i.e., had not brought live poultry into the home or visited a live poultry market or 
had any direct or indirect contact with poultry or pigs).
The third family cluster included a wife and husband with confirmed H7N9 virus infection 
(Fig. 3C, and Section S4 in the Supplementary Appendix). After the wife (confirmed case 1) 
became ill, her husband (confirmed case 2) had prolonged, close, unprotected contact with 
her, including eating with her, providing care for her, and accompanying her to seek medical 
care before her admission to the hospital. He also provided unprotected bedside care for his 
wife in the hospital on April 2 and April 3. The wife had visited a live poultry market within 
7 days before the onset of her ill-ness. The husband did not raise poultry or animals at home 
and had not had any exposures to animals (i.e., had not brought live poultry into the home or 
visited a live poultry market or had any direct or indirect contact with poultry or pigs).
The fourth family cluster included a father and son with confirmed H7N9 virus infection 
(Fig. 3D, and Section S4 in the Supplementary Appendix). After the father (confirmed case 
1) became ill, his son (confirmed case 2) had direct and very close contact with him, 
including hugging, sitting, eating, and sleeping together. The family did not raise poultry or 
other animals and did not bring live poultry into their home. Neither the father nor the son 
had any direct contact with poultry and neither had visited a live poultry market within 2 
weeks before the onset of illness. H7N9 virus infection in the son was identified through 
monitoring and testing of 12 close contacts of confirmed case 1.
MEDICAL CARE TIMELINES
Among the 137 patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection for whom data were available 
(99% of the 139 patients with confirmed cases), the median time from the onset of illness to 
the first medical visit was 1 day, and patients were hospitalized a median of 4 days after the 
onset of illness (Table 2). Among 109 of the patients with available data on oseltamivir 
administration, 79 (72%) received oseltamivir treatment beginning a median of 6 days 
(range, 0 to 15) after the onset of illness. ARDS developed during the course of 
hospitalization in 48 of 83 patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection for whom data 
were available (58%) after a median of 7 days, and 47 patients died a median of 21 days 
after the onset of illness.
CLOSE CONTACTS
As of December 1, excluding data on patients with confirmed cases who were close contacts 
of index patients in the four family clusters, data were available for 2675 close contacts of 
the 139 patients with confirmed cases, in Zhejiang (1133 contacts), Jiangsu (552), Shanghai 
(378), Anhui (135), Fujian (111), Hunan (91), Guangdong (103), Beijing (43), Henan (42), 
Jiangxi (46), Hebei (30), and Shandong (11). Among the 1953 close contacts of the patients 
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with confirmed cases for whom demographic information was available, 1039 (53%) were 
health care workers, 515 (26%) were family members or relatives, and 399 (20%) were 
social contacts. As of December 1, all 2675 contacts had been followed for up for 7 days; 
among these close contacts, respiratory symptoms developed during the 7-day surveillance 
period in 28 (1%): 9 household members, 1 medical intern, 1 patient who shared a room 
with a confirmed case patient, and 17 health care workers (Section S5 in the Supplementary 
Appendix). Throat swabs were collected from these 28 ill contacts a median of 1 day (range, 
0 to 8) after the onset of illness. All 28 ill close contacts were negative for the H7N9 virus, 
as assessed by means of real-time RT-PCR.
CONTROL MEASURES
On April 3, 2013, the NHFPC established the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism 
(JPCM) to lead the national response to H7N9, issued the first national H7N9 technical 
guideline, and implemented enhanced surveillance for H7N9 virus infection among persons 
with influenza-like illness in the existing sentinel surveillance system (Fig. 1). A local JPCM 
was established in four provinces — Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui — on April 7. 
The China CDC established an Internet-based national H7N9 case-reporting system for 
provinces and municipalities on April 19. The national H7N9 technical guideline was 
revised on May 10. Of the 10 affected provinces and 2 municipalities, all except Guangdong 
province launched emergency responses immediately after detection of a confirmed H7N9 
case (Fig. S2 in the Supplementary Appendix) and closed live poultry markets for 1 to 2 
months after an H7N9 case occurred. (Live poultry markets have been forbidden in Beijing 
since 2005.) Live poultry markets in Guangdong were monitored after an H7N9 case was 
identified, and daily poultry deliveries were limited to ensure that the unsold poultry that 
was kept overnight did not exceed 10% of the poultry delivered daily.
The outbreak can be characterized by five phases (Fig. 1, and Fig. S2 in the Supplementary 
Appendix): the initial phase from February 17 through March 27, with sporadic cases 
identified in Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu provinces in eastern China; the epidemic peak 
from March 28 through April 18, during which 98 of the 139 total confirmed cases (71%) 
were reported, in two municipalities and eight provinces; a declining phase from April 19 
through May 31, with a sharp reduction in cases after closure of live poultry markets in one 
municipality and eight provinces; an interepidemic phase from June 1 through September 
30, with only 2 confirmed cases reported; and a reemergence phase beginning October 1, 
with 5 new confirmed H7N9 cases as of December 1.
DISCUSSION
An outbreak of human infections with a novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus began in 
February 2013 and as of December 1 had resulted in 139 confirmed cases identified in 10 
provinces and 2 municipalities, primarily in eastern China. Although persons in a wide age 
spectrum were affected (age range, 2 to 91 years), the majority of patients with confirmed 
H7N9 virus infection were older (median age, 61 years), male (71%), and urban residents 
(73%), and most were considered to be at increased risk for complications from influenza 
owing to age (<5 years or ≥65 years) or the prevalence of certain underlying medical 
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conditions. Most patients were hospitalized with severe lower respiratory tract illness,10 with 
a case fatality proportion of 34% to date. Except for four case clusters among family 
members, most patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection were epidemiologically 
unrelated. Two additional cases in critically ill patients were not included in our analyses; 
one patient had traveled from eastern China to Taiwan, where illness onset occurred and 
H7N9 virus infection was con-firmed,11 and one had traveled from southern China to the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), where illness onset occurred and 
H7N9 virus infection was confirmed in early December. Since December 1, other confirmed 
cases of H7N9 virus infection have been identified in China, HKSAR, and Taiwan.
Human infections with avian influenza A (H7) viruses have been reported sporadically and 
are usually associated with exposures to poultry.12–14 Previous cases of H7 virus infection in 
humans have been characterized by mild illness (conjunctivitis or uncomplicated influenza) 
or by moderate illness (lower respiratory tract disease) that results in hospitalization.
12,13,15,16
 Only one fatal case of H7 virus infection has been reported previously; that case 
occurred in an adult with a highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H7N7) virus infection.17 
Many of the confirmed H7N9 case patients had critical and fatal illness, suggesting that the 
H7N9 virus is more virulent in humans than are other H7 viruses. The age distribution 
among H7N9 case patients is older and wider than that among H5N1 case patients in China 
(Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Appendix), whereas the case fatality proportion and the risk 
of death to date are lower than those for reported cases of H5N1 virus infection in China and 
worldwide.18,19
Early surveillance for H7N9 cases was focused on case finding for severe lower respiratory 
tract illness, and since April 3, expanded testing of outpatients with influenza-like illness has 
identified some mild cases of illness with H7N9 virus infection.20–22 Enhanced surveillance 
for less severe illness with H7N9 virus infection can help to determine the clinical spectrum 
of the illness and the total number of cases of H7N9 symptomatic illness and to inform an 
understanding of the true case fatality proportion. Since this H7N9 virus appears to have 
emerged recently to infect humans, population immunity is expected to be low, and persons 
of any age may be susceptible to infection. Owing to limitations of surveillance and testing, 
the number of patients with confirmed cases of H7N9 virus infection is likely to be an 
underestimate of all symptomatic cases that have occurred. One modeling study estimated 
that 27,000 cases of symptomatic H7N9 virus infection (95% confidence interval, 9530 to 
65,000) had occurred in China as of May 28.23 Very limited data are available from small 
seroprevalence studies.24,25 Larger seroepidemiologic studies among different exposed 
groups can help define the true denominator of H7N9 virus infections.
The median time from the onset of illness to hospitalization among the 133 of 137 patients 
with confirmed H7N9 virus infection for whom data on hospitalization were available was 4 
days, and the median time from the onset of illness to the development of ARDS among the 
48 case patients with ARDS (of 83 patients for whom data on ARDS were available) was 7 
days; the corresponding median times among patients with H5N1 virus infection were 7 
days and 7.5 days.18,26 The median duration from the onset of illness to death among the 47 
persons with confirmed cases who died was 21 days, which is much longer than the 
corresponding median of 11 days among 30 persons with fatal H5N1 cases in China.
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Patients with confirmed H7N9 infection received oseltamivir antiviral treatment a median of 
6 days after the onset of illness (the median before April 3 was 9 days), probably owing to 
delays in seeking medical help and consequent delays in the identification of suspected 
influenza. Retrospective observational studies of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and H5N1 virus 
infections suggest that early oseltamivir treatment has the greatest clinical benefit but that 
starting treatment up to 5 days after the onset of illness may still reduce the risk of critical 
illness and death.27–30 Reports suggest that the H7N9 viruses isolated from humans and 
analyzed to date are resistant to adamantane antiviral agents and are susceptible to 
neuraminidase inhibitors.3,31,32 Early clinical suspicion of H7N9 virus infection and early 
administration of oseltamivir may help to reduce the severity of the disease. However, 
emergence of the R292K mutation in viral neuraminidase, which confers in vitro resistance 
to neuraminidase inhibitors, has been documented in H7N9 viruses during or after 
oseltamivir treatment in some critically ill patients.3,33 Therefore, to inform clinical 
management, clinical trials are needed to define efficacious therapy for H7N9 virus 
infection, including investigational agents and combination antiviral treatment.
Although the source of H7N9 virus infection in patients with confirmed cases who had 
exposure to animals cannot be verified without extensive H7N9 testing of animals, we 
suspect that it is likely to be infected poultry. H7N9 virus is a low pathogenic avian 
influenza A virus and does not cause identifiable illness or death in poultry; therefore, only 
laboratory testing can identify poultry infections. Among cases for which data are available, 
82% occurred in patients who had exposure to live animals such as poultry or swine, 
including during visits to live animal markets. This raises the possibility of zoonotic H7N9 
virus transmission from healthy-appearing poultry or swine to humans through direct or 
close contact or through exposure to environments that are contaminated with infected 
poultry or swine. For example, visiting a live poultry market, where avian influenza A 
viruses can be maintained and amplified, has been identified as a risk factor for H5N1 virus 
infection in Hong Kong34 and urban China.35,36 H7N9 virus has been isolated from poultry 
or environmental specimens collected at live poultry markets that were visited by some 
patients with confirmed cases before the onset of illness, and genetic sequencing results 
revealed the same H7N9 virus strain in viruses isolated from humans and from poultry or 
environmental samples from live poultry markets.37–40 Nine cases of H7N9 virus infection 
(6.5%) occurred in poultry workers, including seven workers in live poultry markets.
Further evidence implicating live poultry markets in urban areas as the source of zoonotic 
H7N9 virus transmission is derived from case-control studies and the observed reduction in 
confirmed H7N9 cases after closure of live poultry markets. One case-control study 
identified direct contact with poultry or birds in the 2 weeks before the onset of illness, 
chronic medical conditions excluding hypertension, and exposure to an environment with 
poultry, including visiting a live poultry market, as risk factors associated with H7N9 virus 
infection.41 A larger study identified visiting live poultry markets as a risk factor, and 
contact with poultry as an independent risk factor, for H7N9 virus infection (unpublished 
data from the China CDC). One ecologic modeling study estimated that closure of live 
poultry markets reduced the mean daily number of H7N9 virus infections in the four most 
affected cities by 97 to 99%.42
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To date, follow-up prospective investigations of close contacts of patients with confirmed 
H7N9 virus infection have not conclusively established human-to-human H7N9 virus 
transmission. However, in four family clusters, limited, nonsustained human-to-human 
transmission of H7N9 virus after close, prolonged, unprotected contact with a symptomatic 
patient with H7N9 virus infection remains a possibility. Confirmed cases in three of the four 
clusters were identified in blood-related family members. Similar family clusters of H5N1 
cases that occurred after common exposures to poultry or limited human-to-human 
transmission have been identified.8,43,44 Paired serum samples were obtained during the 
acute and convalescent stages of illness from contacts of case patients for further assessment 
of the potential for secondary human-to-human H7N9 virus transmission, including the 
potential identification of asymptomatic infections when testing is completed. Several 
studies have shown that H7N9 virus can bind to receptors in both the upper and lower 
airway in humans and can be transmitted variably from experimentally infected ferrets to 
susceptible ferrets by means of droplets.31,37,45,49 These studies support the observation that 
limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission of H7N9 virus might occur.
Although the risk of human-to-human H7N9 virus transmission appears to be low, Chinese 
national guidelines recommend implementing control measures, such as prompt isolation of 
H7N9 patients; implementation of standard, contact, and droplet precautions by health care 
personnel in hospitals; and active monitoring of close contacts for illness. In addition, 
national guidelines recommend that antiviral treatment with oseltamivir should be 
administered as soon as possible in patients with suspected or confirmed cases of H7N9 
virus infection.
Our study had several limitations. First, we were not able to collect detailed information 
from all patients on exposures, such as the times, frequency, intensity, and duration of 
exposures. Information on exposures is useful for estimating the incubation period after 
possible exposure to animals or live-animal markets and for evaluating risk factors for H7N9 
virus infection. Second, we may not have identified all the close contacts of case patients. 
Third, we did not have a standard protocol and questionnaire to collect information from all 
contacts of the 139 patients with confirmed cases. However, the China CDC issued a 
guideline and protocol for field investigations of case patients and close contacts and since 
April 1 has provided training for personnel at all 31 provincial CDCs. A structured Internet-
based reporting system was used to collect information on confirmed cases. This has helped 
to standardize data collection. Fourth, specimens were not available for H7N9 testing from 
some patients with suspected cases. It is also possible that by obtaining a single throat swab 
to test for the presence of the H7N9 virus, as compared with obtaining multiple specimens 
from different respiratory sites on different days, we could have missed detection of the 
virus in symptomatic contacts. Paired serum samples have not been obtained from some of 
the contacts because they have declined to have serum collected. Fifth, in-hospital mortality 
may be an underestimate of H7N9-associated mortality; one patient with a confirmed case 
was hospitalized, recovered, was discharged, and later died of an underlying medical 
condition but was not included as one of the 47 deaths among hospitalized patients with 
confirmed cases. Owing to surveillance limitations, some H7N9 virus infections have 
probably been missed.23 Finally, since the outbreak is ongoing, we were unable to include in 
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our analyses data from the patients with confirmed H7N9 cases that have been identified 
since December 1, 2013, or from their close contacts.
In summary, a novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus has caused severe and fatal lower 
respiratory tract illness in persons in 12 different areas of China. Some clinically mild cases 
have been identified since the surveillance was widened, suggesting that there is a wide 
clinical spectrum of H7N9 virus infection. The epidemiologic findings suggest that most 
confirmed H7N9 cases were epidemiologically unrelated. On the basis of data from various 
studies to date, most case patients were probably exposed to H7N9 virus and infected during 
visits to live poultry markets, and the decline in cases during May followed the closure of 
live poultry markets in Shanghai municipality and nine provinces. Follow-up investigations 
of contacts of patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection suggest that the risk of 
secondary transmission of H7N9 virus, including to health care personnel, is low at this 
time. However, in four family clusters, limited, nonsustained human-to-human transmission 
of H7N9 virus could not be ruled out and may have occurred.
On the basis of the experience with increased circulation of H5N1 virus among poultry 
during periods of cooler temperatures, the spread of H7N9 virus among poultry is likely to 
increase during the winter and spring months, with the potential for increased transmission 
to exposed persons. Therefore, enhanced surveillance for H7N9 virus among poultry and 
people, investigations of contacts of confirmed cases, and vi-rologic analyses to assess 
genetic changes that might suggest increased transmissibility among humans are all critical 
to informing prevention and control efforts and assessing the pandemic potential of this 
H7N9 virus. Prompt closure of live poultry markets is indicated in areas where new human 
cases of H7N9 virus infection are detected.
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Figure 1. Date of Onset of Illness in 139 Patients with Confirmed H7N9 Virus Infection in China.
Detailed information on closures of live poultry markets and emergency responses in 10 
provinces and 2 municipalities is provided in Figure S2 in the Supplementary Appendix. 
CDC denotes Center for Disease Control and Prevention, ILI influenza-like illness, JPCM 
Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism, and NIC National Influenza Center.
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Figure 2. 
Geographic Distribution of 139 Confirmed Cases of H7N9 Virus Infection in China, as of 
December 1, 2013.
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Figure 3. Timeline of Pertinent Exposures and Dates of Illness Onset in Four Family Clusters of 
Cases of H7N9 Virus Infection in China.
ICU denotes intensive care unit, and rRT-PCR real-time reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-
chain-reaction assay.
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Table 2.
Clinical Characteristics and Medical Care Timelines for 139 Patients with Confirmed H7N9 Virus Infection in 
China.*
Variable
Patients with Confirmed
Cases (N = 139)
Clinical outcome — no./total no. (%)†
  Required hospitalization 137/139 (99)
  Currently hospitalized 2/139 (1)
  Admitted to ICU 65/103(63)
  Required mechanical ventilation 56/91 (62)
  Had ARDS 48/83 (58)
  Died in hospital‡ 47/139 (34)
  Recovered 90/139 (65)
Oseltamivir treatment — no./total no. (%) 79/109 (72)
Time from illness onset to oseltamivir treatment — days
  Median 6.0
  Interquartile range 5.0–9.0
Time from illness onset to first medical care — days
  Median 1.0
  Interquartile range 0-–3.0
Time from illness onset to hospitalization — days
  Median 4.0
  Interquartile range 3.0–6.0
Time from illness onset to ICU admission — days
  Median 7.0
  Interquartile range 5.0–9.0
Time from illness onset to development of ARDS — days
  Median 7.0
  Interquartile range 5.0–9.0
Time from illness onset to death — days
  Median 21.0
  Interquartile range 12.5–36.0
*
In the case of some characteristics, complete data were not available for all 139 patients with confirmed H7N9 virus infection. Case investigations 
are ongoing. ARDS denotes acute respiratory distress syndrome, and ICU intensive care unit.
†A total of 87 patients with confirmed cases had been discharged as of December 1, 2013. One 2-year-old boy with a confirmed case in Shanghai 
was not hospitalized, because his illness was mild; he recovered 5 days after the onset of illness. A 25-year-old woman with a confirmed case in 
Jiangsu province was not hospitalized, because her illness was mild, and she recovered 18 days after the onset of illness.
‡One additional death occurred after hospital discharge and is not included as a death in the hospital. This was a case patient from Jiangsu province 
who recovered and was discharged from the hospital in August but died at home in September from an underlying medical condition.
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